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REFORMING THE JURY OVERRIDE:
PROTECTING CAPITAL DEFENDANTS'




The death penalty has been justified as the "community's judgment...
[of] the defendant's outrageous affront to humanity."' In Alabama and
Florida,2 the two states that use the so-called "jury override ' 3 in capital
cases, the ultimate decision of life or death is left to the trial judge, not to
the jury, as the best reflection of the "community's judgment." After the
guilt phase of the trial, the jury issues only an advisory sentence of life or
death, which the trial judge has the authority to override.4 In Alabama and
Florida, judges have used their override power eighty-three and 167 times
respectively, to sentence a defendant to death after a jury recommended
. J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2004. The author wishes
to thank Professor Michael Radelet for providing data on the use of the override in Florida,
as well as Scott Erlich, Jason Tran, and LaTour Rey Lafferty, whose notes provided
excellent background of which liberal use was made in Parts II and Part IV. Kari and
Benjamin Richardson also deserve special mention for their support.
I Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001). In addition,
Delaware and Indiana had previously used the override scheme in capital cases, but the
legislatures in these states have recently passed legislation changing their systems. See infra
note 41.
3 Justice O'Connor called it a "hybrid sentencing scheme" in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 620 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), yet the vast majority of scholarly literature refers
to it as the "jury override." See Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the
Jury Override, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1017; Scott E. Erlich, The Jury Override: A Blend of
Politics and Death, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 1403 (1996); Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do
Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923
(1991); Michael Radelet & Michael Mello, Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving The Resources
of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 196 (1992).
4 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994).
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life.' Originally envisioned by the legislatures as a way for judges to
safeguard the capital sentencing process by reversing outraged, "inflamed"
juries set on imposing death,6 the data supports a different conclusion:
When judges use their override power, they use it to impose death in the
vast majority of cases.
The override has been the subject of legal scholarship over the past
decade,8 but recent events make a re-examination of the issue and reform
suggestions timely. In June 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ring v.
Arizona that a trial judge alone could not determine the presence of
aggravating and mitigating factors for imposing the death penalty without
violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 9 The Court
held that a jury must make the fact findings required to increase a
defendant's sentence.' 0  In Arizona, where judges made sentencing
decisions alone, Ring struck down the state's capital sentencing law."
Scholars maintain there is little difference between the Arizona system and
the override as the judge retains the ultimate power for sentencing in both.'
2
Yet appellate courts in Alabama and Florida that have reviewed cases
brought under Ring have been reluctant to strike down their own laws for
fear of "seriously undermining citizens' faith in [their] judicial system[s]." 3
Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles Wells warned that if Ring
5 Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at A21 (citing Stephen B. Bright of the Southern Center for
Human Rights on the number of Alabama overrides); E-mail from Michael L. Radelet,
Professor, University of Colorado (Nov. 4, 2003, 03:20:15 CST) (on file with author)
(providing data on the Florida overrides).
6 LaTour Rey Lafferty, Florida's Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We
Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 475-76 (1995)
(citing Sue Carlton, Juries Could Lose Court Clout, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 22, 1995,
at B9).
7 See infra notes 88-89.
8 See Burnside, supra note 3; Erlich, supra note 3; Mello, supra note 3; Radelet & Mello,
supra note 3.
' 536 U.S. 584,607 (2002).
'0 Id. at 607-08.
11 Id.
12 Liptak, supra note 5, at A21 (quoting Professor Lawrence Marshall, Northwestern
University School of Law and Professor James S. Liebman, Columbia University School of
Law); see also Brad Smith, A Say in Matters of Life and Death, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 29, 2002,
at I (discussing how the Court's invalidation of the Arizona law "casts a long shadow" on
the Florida system).
13 Smith, supra note 12, at 3. Two recent cases in Alabama and Florida where the courts
have refused to invalidate the override are Martin v. State, No. CR-99-2249, 2003 WL
21246587 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30, 2003) and Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.
2002) (per curiam).
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invalidates the Florida system, most of Florida's death row inmates would
have a new basis for challenging their sentences, which would have a
"catastrophic effect on the administration of justice.' 4
Fearing the worst, state legislators have introduced bills to reform the
override, believing that ultimately the current system will have to change.' 5
Thus, with speculation surrounding the override's future,1 6 it is appropriate
to review long-standing constitutional concerns about the system and to
further explore why the state courts are upholding the override, despite the
seemingly obvious dictates of Ring.
Equally important, this Comment sets forth reasons why the override
should not be completely overhauled, as some have advocated, and why a
return to the system's original purpose is needed.17 The controversial life-
to-death override should be abolished, but the death-to-life override, where
the trial judge acts as a check on the sentencing process, should be retained.
In fact, the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment recently
recommended adopting a variation on the death-to-life override as part of
that state's capital sentencing reform process. 18 The "catastrophic effect" of
striking down the override laws can be avoided with common-sense
reforms that retain many of the safeguards that served as the impetus for the
override design. 19
14 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698 (Wells, J., concurring).
15 Jackie Hallifax, State Lawmakers Consider Giving Life Decision to Capital Juries,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES PLUS, Jan. 8, 2003 (citing Florida State Senator Rod Smith's
bill, S.B. 120, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003), which would have prohibited judges from overriding
jury recommendations of life sentences). Senate Bill 120 died in the Committee on Criminal
Justice on May 2, 2003. In Alabama, State Senator Rodger Mell Smitherman proposed
similar legislation on Feb. 3, 2004 "to prohibit a court from overriding a jury verdict." S.B.
190, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2004).
16 John Gibeaut, States Revisit Death Sentence Cases, Prosecutors Look to Preserve
Capital Rulings in Wake of High Court Decision, ABA J. E-REPORT (June 28, 2002), at
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/j28death.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
17 See Burnside, supra note 3; Erlich, supra note 3; Mello, supra note 3.
18 COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, GEORGE H. RYAN, GOVERNOR 152 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/chapterl i.pdf ("In cases
where the trial judge does not concur in the imposition of the death penalty, the defendant
shall be sentenced to natural life as a mandatory alternative ....").
19 See Part III, infra, for a discussion of the original policy rationales set forth for
adopting the override. Justice Stevens in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 n.6 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), noted: "I have always believed the legislative decision to authorize
an override was intended to protect the defendant from the risk of an erroneous jury decision
to impose the death penalty." This Comment provides reform suggestions in Part V that
make the system consistent with this original understanding.
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Part II reviews the history of how the override developed in response
to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia20 and
details the capital sentencing process in Florida and Alabama, the only two
states to use the override. Part IH explores the various policy rationales for
the system, explaining how it was adopted as a check on "inflamed" juries
and how the data suggests it is used differently in practice. Part 1V reviews
constitutional challenges made by defendants who have had jury
recommendations of life overridden, including arguments made on Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Finally, Part V concludes that
the life-to-death override fails to adequately safeguard capital defendants'
constitutional rights and makes suggestions for how the system can be
improved with modifications.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE OVERRIDE AND A REVIEW OF THE STATUTORY
SCHEME
A. FURMAN REQUIRED GUIDED DISCRETION
In Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juries alone
could not have complete discretion over sentencing a defendant to death. 2'
Motivated by concern that racial discrimination was influencing the
sentencing process,2 the Furman Court held that by not providing proper
guidance to jurors, state and federal death penalty laws in 1972 violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments as it is applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Justice Stewart's concurrence noted that jury discretion was being
administered in a "freakish" and "wanton" 24 manner, providing no clear
explanation for why some defendants are sentenced to death and others
20 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Id. at 239-40.
22 Id. at 249-53 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas expressed concern that the
system singled out minorities and the poor:
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the
penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and
saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position . . . . [T]hese
discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on "cruel and unusual" punishments.
Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23 See id. at 238.
24 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (characterizing death as "'wantonly and ...
freakishly' inflicted").
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spared.25 The Furman Court thus required that a "[s]entencer's discretion
... be properly channeled and guided so as to minimize the risk that death
will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. '26  While not a per se
constitutional violation, the inconsistent manner in which death was handed
down ran contrary to the Court's mandate that it be imposed with
heightened scrutiny.27 The Furman ruling struck down state and federal
death penalty laws, requiring that all new statutory schemes be "reasoned
and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory.,
28
As a result, thirty-five states responded by enacting new laws that
either created mandatory death sentences for certain offenses or provided
29more guidance for capital juries. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the
25 Generally, in death penalty cases, the Court asks: (1) whether death comports with
community values and evolving standards of decency; (2) whether the sentence is
proportionate to the offense; and (3) whether the death sentence was administered in a non-
arbitrary manner. Erlich, supra note 3, at 1407-08. The jury override was developed as an
attempt to meet the standards associated with the "non-arbitrary" factor. See Michael Mello
& Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury. Florida 's Practice of Imposing Death over Life in
Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 52-55 (1985).
26 Erlich, supra note 3, at 1412 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
27 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (the Court noted that
the "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of
reliability when the death sentence is imposed").
28 State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973) (citing Furman's effect).
29 Erlich, supra note 3, at 1413 (citing Alan Bigel, Justice William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall on Capital Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect,
and Interpretation by the Court, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1I, 66-67
(1995)); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976) (citing the following state
statutes that were enacted to establish new death penalty laws in the wake of Furman,
including: ALA. H.B. 212, §§ 2-4, 6-7 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13- 452 to 13-454
(Supp. 1973); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-4706 (Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 209,
219 (Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. 1974, c. 52, § 4; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-25, 53a-
35(b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (Supp. 1975-1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528, 27-
2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (Supp. 1975); ILL. COMP. ANN. STAT.
c. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-1A (Supp. 1976-1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-13-4-1 (1975);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1976); MD.
ANN. CODE, ART. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55,
99- 17-20 (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559.009, 559.005 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-401, 29-
2521 to 29-2523 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1
(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (1975); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975); Ono REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-2929.04 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975-1976); 1974 Pa. Laws, Act No. 46; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31
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Court struck down the mandatory death penalty statutes for certain offenses
that had been enacted in ten states, citing their failure to take defendants'
individual circumstances into account, as required by the Eighth
Amendment.3 °
Citing the presence of clear standards for guiding jury discretion,31 the
Court in Gregg v. Georgia, Profitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. Texas32 upheld
the statutes enacted in the other twenty-five states, 33 all of which provided
for a bifurcated trial, where the jury first determines the defendant's guilt,
and then determines the existence of specific aggravating and mitigating
factors in a separate hearing during the sentencing phase.34 By focusing the
jury on aggravating and mitigating factors, these so-called "guided
discretion statutes ' 35 prohibited juries from deciding the issue of life or
death based on gut reaction alone.
36
Furthermore, the Court detailed the features of the new laws that better
protect defendants' constitutional rights. The Court in Gregg specified
three safeguards that must be present: bifurcation (having two successive
phases of conviction and then sentencing);37 balancing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances where at least one aggravating factor must be
found to justify death;38 and direct review of death penalty verdicts by the
(1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046 (Supp. 1975); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54
(Supp. 1975)).
30 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Erlich, supra note 3, at 1414-15 (citing Woodson,
428 U.S. at 298-304).
3' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E. 2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
32 See David A. Scheffel, Harris v. Alabama-A Portrait of Deference to the States in
Capital Punishment, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39, 40 (1997) (providing the background for
these cases: Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
33 Erlich, supra note 3, at 1409-10 (citing Kathleen Weron, Rethinking Utah's Death
Penalty Statute: A Constitutional Requirement for the Narrowing of Aggravating
Circumstances, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1107, 1112-13, for a list of the twenty-five states whose
schemes were upheld).
34 Id. at 1415.
35 Id. at 1414 (citing Weron, supra note 35, at 1113 (referring to states' attempts to give
greater guidance to jurors)).
36 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
37 Jason C. Tran, Death by Judicial Overkill: The Unconstitutionality of Overriding Jury
Recommendations Against the Death Penalty, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 865 (1997) (citing
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195).
38 Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97). For example, under section 921.141(l)-(5) of
the Florida statute, a majority of the jury must find that at least one aggravating factor exists
to recommend death. The list of aggravating factors under section 921.141(5) include: (a)
the felony was committed by a defendant under sentence of imprisonment; (b) the defendant
was previously convicted of another capital felony involving the use of violence; (c) the
defendant knowingly created a great risk of harm to many persons; (d) the capital felony was
460 [Vol. 94
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state's highest court.3 9 In Gregg, Profitt, and Jurek, the Court upheld the
re-enacted statutes in Georgia, Florida, and Texas respectively, as having
encompassed these safeguards. °
Among the states that adopted "guided discretion statutes," three
distinct types of capital sentencing schemes emerged, where either juries
have exclusive sentencing authority; judges have exclusive sentencing
authority; or juries play an advisory role to the judge, who ultimately
renders the final verdict.4' Thus, while states differed in their approach to
complying with Furman, the systems developed by the states to avoid
arbitrary sentencing either gave the judge or jury exclusive power, or
combined power in both. The latter approach-the override--combines the
features of the two extremes in its hybrid scheme.
B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The override complies with the Furman decision by requiring separate
trial and sentencing phases, followed by automatic appellate review.
After a defendant is found guilty of a capital crime as prescribed by state
law,43 a sentencing hearing is held before the same judge and jury to
committed during the commission of a robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, or
kidnapping; (e) the felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement; (f)
the felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (g) the offense was committed to disrupt or
hinder the enforcement of the laws; or (h) the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001).
39 Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204).
40 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207; Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976).
41 Tran, supra note 37, at 866-67 (noting that of the thirty-eight states that have the death
penalty today, thirty give sole sentencing discretion to the jury; four states, including
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, give this authority to the judge; Nevada gives
sentencing authority to a three-judge panel; and four states used to give juries an advisory
role and allow judges to override the jury recommendation, including Alabama, Delaware,
Florida, and Indiana). The Delaware and Indiana legislatures, however, passed legislation
changing their systems such that the trial judge must now accept the jury's findings with
respect to aggravating factors, thus transforming the jury's advisory role. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. I I § 4209 (2001) ("A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury, if a
jury is impaneled, first finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at
least I statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this
section .. "); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (Michie 1998) ("The court shall instruct the
jury that, in order for the jury to recommend to the court that the death penalty or life
imprisonment without parole should be imposed, the jury must find at least one (1)
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt .... ).
42 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39, 40,43,47,53 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1)-(8).
43 Under section 13A-5-40 of the Alabama Code, the defendant must be found guilty of
one of five enumerated capital offense categories before the death penalty will be imposed.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40.
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determine whether the defendant receives life imprisonment or death.4 At
the conclusion of the hearing, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in rendering an advisory verdict. 45  In Florida, a simple
majority of the jury determines the advisory verdict, after which the judge
hands down the final verdict. 46  In Alabama, the jury's advisory
recommendation must be based on a vote of at least ten jurors.47 The judge
in each state is also required to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in making a written decision, to better facilitate appellate
review.48
Under section 921.141(4) of the Florida Statutes, all death sentences
must be reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court. By contrast, section 13A-
5-53 of the Alabama Code calls for appellate review of death sentences by
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals only, although this court's findings
may be reviewed by the Alabama Supreme Court. Appellate review under
section 13A-5-53 includes a proportionality test and "weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 'A9 but the weighing of factors is
based on the judge's factual findings, not on the jury's.
As an additional protection in Florida, the state supreme court held in
Tedder v. State5° that a trial judge may only override a jury's advisory
verdict if the facts are "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ." 5' Alabama has not adopted the same standard. In
Harris v. Alabama,52 the defendant argued the Tedder standard was
required, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed: "The Constitution... [is]
not offended when a State requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury's
recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight.1
53
Alabama judges are thus given enormous discretion, leading to the
perception that the override gives them "unchecked power. ,54 As the next
sections discuss, the vesting of ultimate authority to sentence death with the
44 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1)-(2).
45 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921-141(1)-(2).
46 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
47 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(.
41 Id. § 13A-5-46(d); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
49 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(2).
" 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) ("In order to sustain a sentence of death following a
jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.").
51 Id.
52 513 U.S. 504, 506 (1995).
53 Id. at 515; see Erlich, supra note 3; Tran, supra note 37.
54 Erlich, supra note 3, at 1431.
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trial judge has proven problematic on both policy and constitutional
grounds.
II1. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. THE DEATH-TO-LIFE OVERRIDE: A NECESSARY SAFEGUARD
The states envisioned the override as a check against the arbitrary
manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court believed the death penalty was
being handed down in Furman.5' By permitting the trial judge to override
an "inflamed" jury,56 the state in theory was adding protection for capital
defendants. In fact, in Dobbert v. Florida,57 a case in which the Court
upheld the Florida override scheme, Justice Rehnquist emphasized this
point:
[T]he new statute affords significantly more safeguards .... Death is not automatic,
absent a jury recommendation of mercy, as it was under the old procedure ...
[U]nlike the old statute, a jury determination of death is not binding. Under the new
statute, defendants have a second chance for life with the trial judge and a third, if
necessary, with the Florida Supreme Court.
58
In rejecting a jury's advisory sentence, the judge is called upon to set
aside emotion and to apply the law consistently. The most recent case of a
death-to-life override in Florida illustrates how the system is designed to
work. Walter Morris, the defendant, was sentenced to death for the 1997
beating of two-year-old Dustin Gee.59 Morris, the boyfriend of the boy's
mother, beat the child to death after Gee blocked his view of the television
as he watched professional wrestling.60  Standing over six feet tall and
weighing 260 pounds, Morris struck the child several times, stepped on his
head, kicked him in the stomach, and shook him violently, snapping his
neck before Gee eventually died.6 Despite these gruesome facts, the judge
ruled that a death sentence was not appropriate as the boy's death "was not
planned or done with premeditation [and] came about as a result of
[Morris's] inability to control his temper. 62  Morris's own history of
55 See Mello & Robson, supra note 25, at 52-55.
56 Lafferty, supra note 6, at 476.
7 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977).
l Id. at 295-96.
59 State v. Morris, No. CRC9722749CFANO (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2001); William R.
Levesque, 2-Year-Old Boy's Killer Avoids Death Penalty, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 16,
2001, at lB.





emotional and physical abuse as a child played a factor in the judge's
decision.63
Given Morris's savage crime against such a helpless victim, it was not
surprising that the jury recommended death. The trial judge, however,
acted as a check on the jury's emotional response in deciding that Morris's
conduct, although despicable, did not rise to the level of a capital offense
under the law.
In practice, judges have used their authority in this way on limited
occasion. In Florida, there have been over 800 cases in which a trial judge
sentenced a defendant to death following a jury's recommendation of
death,6 but only sixty-four cases65 where a judge used the death-to-life
override. In Alabama, there have been only seven cases in which a judge
used the death-to-life override altogether.66
While the death-to-life override has been rarely used, the need for such
a safeguard is underscored by research finding that juries often fail to apply
the law correctly to the facts and circumstances in capital cases.67 The
Capital Jury Project 68 (CJP) has concluded that jurors make up their minds
whether to impose life or death well before the sentencing phase begins,
frequently misunderstand the trial judge's instructions, and report in
surveys that they "lower the level of their responsibility at the sentencing
63 id.
6 Michael Radelet, Recent Developments in the Death Penalty in Florida, Paper
Presented at a Conference of the Florida Public Defender Association (Sept. 7, 2001), at
http://www.cuadp.org/florida/fldpinfo.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) ("819 post-Furman
cases decided by the Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal in which a defendant was
sentenced to death following a jury recommendation of death").
65 E-mail from Michael L. Radelet, supra note 5.
66 Liptak, supra note 5, at A21 (citing Stephen Bright of the Southern Center for Human
Rights for the figure of seven death to life overrides); see also EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF
ALABAMA, REPRESENTATION OF DEATH Row PRISONERS, at http://www.eji.org/
representation.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (noting that 190 inmates currently sentenced
to death in Alabama).
67 Lafferty, supra note 6, at 477 ("[F]indings suggest that an experienced trial judge,
rather than a reluctant jury, is better equipped to reflect community sentiment.").
68 Lafferty explains that the Capital Jury Project is:
an attempt to analyze how capital juries decide between life or death sentences. The intent is to
examine 'the extent to which jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion is still infected
with, or now cured of, the arbitrariness which the United States Supreme Court condemned in
Furman v. Georgia, and the extent to which the principal kinds of post-Furnan guided discretion
statutes are curbing arbitrary decision-making-as the Court said they would in Gregg v,
Georgia and its companion cases.
Id. at 476 (quoting William Bowers, The Capital Jury Project; Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1043 (1995)).
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stage., 69 The CJP researchers, who conducted interviews with eighty-three
jurors in the early 1990's, also report that jurors do not adequately
understand death penalty instructions.7° Given these findings, the trial
judge's oversight and authority to override a confused jury is a welcome
safeguard. As the late Governor Lawton Chiles noted, the override presents
"a unique and delicate balance of a jury's expression of community values
and a judge's expertise regarding the application of the law.",
7 1
Other scholars have noted another significant benefit of the death-to-
life override: judicial efficiency.72 As outlined in Part II.B, both override
states provide for automatic appellate review when a defendant is sentenced
to death.73 In cases where the jury recommends death, the Florida Supreme
Court more often than not reduces these sentences to life imprisonment
based on proportionality concerns.74 By providing for immediate "judicial
intervention" at the trial level, the death-to-life override "allows an early
and efficient means to filter out cases for which the death penalty is
inappropriate. 75
69 Scheffel, supra note 32, at 50 (citing Bowers, supra note 68, at 1044); see also Tran,
supra note 37, at 884 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 331 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("This desire [to 'send a message'] might make the jury very receptive to the
prosecutor's assurance that it can more freely 'err because the error may be corrected on
appeal."')). In Caldwell, the Supreme Court held that it is "constitutionally impermissible"
to sentence a defendant to death by jurors who were "led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." 472 U.S. at 328-
29. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the right of prosecutors, however, to mention the
advisory role of the jury in Card v. State. 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Brown v.
State, 721 So. 2d 274, 283 (Fla. 1998) ("holding that the standard jury instructions fully
advise the jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role
of the jury, and do not violate Caldwell")).
70 Scheffel, supra note 32, at 50.
7' Lafferty, supra note 6, at 477 (quoting Florida Governor Lawton Chiles' Veto of Fla.
House Bill 1319 (1995) and a letter from Gov. Chiles to Secretary of State Sandra B.
Mortham, June 14, 1995) (on file with Sec'y of State, the Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.); see
also Chiles Vetoes Jury Recommendation Bill, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 15, 1995, at B5.
However, Governor Chiles was later quoted as saying, "I think we'd be better... if we did
away with the override." Erlich, supra note 3, at 1452 (quoting Ellen McGarrahan, State
Ponders Changing Steps to Execution, MiAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 1991, at 6B). But, as Erlich
notes, this did not stop Gov. Chiles from signing a death warrant for Robert Francis, who
had his life sentence increased to death pursuant to the override statute. Id.
72 Radelet & Mello, supra note 3, at 208.
73 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 2001); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (1994).
74 Radelet & Mello, supra note 3, at 208 n.72 (citing cases where the Florida Supreme




B. HIGH ERROR RATES BOLSTER NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS
When former Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted the sentences
of all of Illinois's death row inmates on January 11, 2003,76 he cited his
belief that Illinois's system "is haunted by the demon of error: error in
determining guilt and error in determining who among the guilty deserves
to die. 77 Concern over errors in capital punishment is certainly not limited
to Illinois. As of December 2003, 112 death row inmates have been found
innocent and released from prison. 8 As recently as August 2003, a federal
judge in Boston noted that "substantial evidence has emerged to
demonstrate that innocent individuals are sentenced to death, and
undoubtedly executed, much more than previously understood,, 79 and that
the crucial question left before declaring the death penalty unconstitutional
is "how large a fraction of the executed must be innocent to offend
contemporary standards of decency."'
The two override states have particularly poor records in this area.
Florida ranks first among states in number of exonerations, with twenty-
four death row inmates having been released due to evidence of their
innocence.81 Alabama's error rate is similarly high, where it is estimated
that at least three-fourths of all capital cases have been subject to some form
of error. 2 The high error rate in the override states is even more appalling
considering that Florida ranks second in the nation for juvenile executions
with thirty-one, and Alabama ranks third with eighteen. 3 The override
states also lie in the heart of the "death belt," the region of the country
76 See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University College [sic] of Law
(Jan. 11, 2003), available at http://www.cuadp.org/200301 I Iryan.html.
77 Id.
78 American Civil Liberties Union, A Question of Innocence, at http://www.aclu.org/
DeathPenalty/DeathPenalty.cfm (Dec. 9, 2003). For an excellent discussion of wrongful
convictions, see MICHAEL RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992) or BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
79 Adam Liptak, Judge Says Enough Doubt Exists to End Capital Punishment, CHI.
TRiB., Aug. 12, 2003, at C13 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Mark Wolf).
80 Id.
81 American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Legal Issues, The Death Penalty System, at
http://www.aclufl.org/legalissuesdec2002.html (Dec. 2002).
82 Id.
83 Id. In addition, Alabama has been cited as having "the worst criminal defense system
in the country, according to the American Bar Association." Chris Adams, Faces of
Innocence, Condemned to Die Alone: Injustice on Death Row in Alabama, CHAMPION, Nov.
2001, at 13 (citing Ken Silverstein, The Judge as Lynch Mob: How Alabama Judges Use
Judicial Overrides to Disregard Juries and Impose Death Sentences, AMERICAN SPECTATOR,
May 7, 200 1, at 26).
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spanning from Texas to Virginia where over eighty percent of executions
occur,8 4 and thus safeguard efforts like the death-to-life override have the
potential to cut error rates for a large portion of capital defendants.
C. THE LIFE-TO-DEATH OVERRIDE: A STEP BACKWARD
Where the death-to-life override provides additional safeguards, the
life-to-death override provides an additional opportunity for the defendant
to be put to death. Contrary to what many legislators thought when they
drafted the override laws, 5 judges use the life-to-death override more
frequently. As of November 2003, there have been 167 life-to-death
overrides in Florida compared to just sixty-four death-to-life overrides.8 6 In
Alabama, as of late 2002, there had been eighty-three life-to-death overrides
compared to just seven death-to-life overrides.87
In addition to subjecting capital defendants to another opportunity to
be sentenced to death, the life-to-death override is inefficient, as one author
reports that in roughly eighty percent of the cases where the judge overrode
the jury's life recommendation in Florida, the state supreme court reversed
the trial judge.88 The Florida Supreme Court spends about half of its time
on death penalty cases, which places considerable strain on its ability to
efficiently handle its docket.89 In fact, the court appointed a Supreme Court
Workload Commission in 2000 to suggest reforms.90 By giving trial judges
the life-to-death override, the legislature forces the state supreme court to
spend its time inefficiently on cases it overwhelmingly reverses.
The strongest criticism of the life-to-death override scheme, however,
has come on constitutional grounds. Since 1972, when Florida was the first
84 American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, supra note 81.
85 Liptak, supra note 5, at A21:
Mr. Tabak [co-chairman of the American Bar Association committee on the death penalty] said
that proponents of the legislation giving judges the death penalty decision in Florida and
Alabama were surprised by these trends [that judges override life to death more often than death
to life]. They thought they were protecting defendants against inflamed juries.
86 E-Mail from Michael L. Radelet, supra note 5.
87 Liptak, supra note 5, at A21 (quoting Stephen B. Bright of the Southern Center for
Human Rights).
88 Carrie A. Dannenfelser, Burch v. State: Maintaining the Jury's Traditional Role as the
Voice of the Community in Capital Punishment Cases, 60 MD. L. REv. 417, 436 (2001); see
also Erlich, supra note 3, at 1432 ("Another commentator concluded that '[o]ver the past
half decade . . . overrides have been reversed in more than ninety-three percent of the
relevant cases [and] ... overrides of life recommendations have survived appellate review in
less than seven percent of the cases.").
89 Martin Dyckman, Death Penalty is Costly, Capricious, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.




state to enact an override statute,9' opponents have challenged the
constitutionality of the system on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Two strong challenges to the life-to-death override have been
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee 92 and the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments 93 as it is
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.94  One of the
strongest due process challenges came in the case of Profitt v. Florida,95
where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death.96  Profitt argued that Florida's override statute did not adequately
ensure due process guarantees because it failed to give the judge and jury
specific sentencing guidelines for weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the override, ruling that it
adequately guides and channels sentencing discretion.97 As part of its
rationale, the Court noted that judges' experience and expertise are
welcome additions to the capital sentencing process.98
The very nature of the death penalty, however, runs contrary to the
spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "life." 99  The Court
applies heightened scrutiny when depriving citizens of this most
fundamental right. 00 The central concern is that as elected officials, state
91 Tran, supra note 37, at 872.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
93 Id. amend. VIII.
94 Id. amend. XIV.
95 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
96 Id. at 246.
97 Id. at 258.
98 Id. at 252:
And it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial
judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law ... [that]
deprive[s] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
'00 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (remarking that "the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other
punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards").
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judges are unable to stay objective in the face of political pressures.' O' In
Tumey v. Ohio,10 2 the Court held that where a judge is tempted by political
reward and finds herself in two "inconsistent positions" (as a politician and
as a judge), there "necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the
trial of defendants charged before [her]. ' 3 In addition, empirical evidence
suggests that judges do, in fact, succumb to political pressure. According to
The Equal Justice Initiative, "there is a statistically significant correlation
between judicial override and election years in most counties where these
overrides take place.... [I]t is [a clear] example of the precise dynamic of
politics in the administration of the death penalty."' 4
Delaware provides an illustration of this point, as until recently it was
an override state that appointed its judges. In all seven cases where the
override was used, Delaware judges overrode jury recommendations from
death-to-life.'0 5 This record is consistent with the results override advocates
in Florida and Alabama predicted when drafting their laws. 0 6 Delaware's
experience suggests politics plays a role in a judge's decision and that
judges generally choose life in the absence of political pressure.
On Eighth Amendment grounds, the argument is that only the jury, as
a reflection of the community, should assess what constitutes "cruel and
unusual punishments."' °7  Justice Stevens has written that the death
penalty's only "credible justification" is that it is an "expression of the
community's outrage. To permit the state to execute [the defendant] in
101 For an excellent discussion of judges who pandered to political constituencies and
were rebuked by the federal courts, see Erlich, supra note 3, at 1442-45. See also Karin E.
Garvey, Eighth Amendment-The Constitutionality of the Alabama Capital Sentencing
Scheme, 86 J. CRiM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1411, 1433-35 (1996).
102 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927).
103 Burnside, supra note 3, at 1044-47 (citing Tumey v. State, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927));
see also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 308, 310 (1997) (quoting Justice Stevens's Opening Assembly Address on Aug. 3,
1996 at the American Bar Association meeting in Orlando: "[l]t was never contemplated that
the individual who has to protect our individual rights would have to consider what decision
would produce the most votes.").
104 Burnside, supra note 3, at 1039 (quoting Politics and the Death Penalty: Can
Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 254 (1994)).
105 Liptak, supra note 5, at A21 (citing Delaware as the only state with both an override
scheme and appointed judges).
106 See id. (quoting Robert Tabak regarding how override advocates thought they were
protecting defendants against inflamed juries, not subjecting them to harsher punishment).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1.
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spite of the community's considered judgment that [the defendant] should
not die is to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring. '"108 •
The Court, however, has rejected the argument that the override
violates the Eighth Amendment. The leading challenge on Eighth
Amendment grounds came in Harris v. Alabama,'09 where the defendant
was convicted of having her husband killed for $250,000 in insurance
benefits. 110 Because of the defendant's history as a hardworking, caring
mother, the jury voted seven-to-five to sentence her to life in prison without
parole, but the trial judge overrode the jury's advisory verdict finding that
the one aggravating factor, murder for pecuniary gain, was sufficient to
warrant death."1 '
The Court held that the "Eighth Amendment does not require the state
to define the weight the sentencing judge must accord to an advisory
verdict" nor does it require the Tedder rule, which the Court praised in
earlier cases.1 12 The majority decided it would not "micromanage"' 13 the
manner in which states drafted their capital sentencing laws. So long as the
system avoided the arbitrariness warned against in Furman, the override
would be constitutional.
14
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant "the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime
shall have been committed." '115 The language of the Sixth Amendment does
not specify that sentencing be conducted by a jury. One commentator
argues, however, that if you have a right to a public trial, it is more
appropriate that jurors, as community representatives, "have the last say on
whether a fellow citizen should live or die."' 1 6 In addition, scholars argue
the guilt and sentencing phases are part of the same public trial and thus
jury protections should extend to both.'17
108 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 526 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
o Id. at 507.
I" d. at 508.
112 Scheffel, supra note 32, at 53 (quoting Harris, 513 U.S. at 512).
113 Harris, 513 U.S. at 524.
114 Id. When Harris was decided, the Court upheld the schemes of the judge-only
sentencing states and it thus would not have been likely to have found the override
unconstitutional.
115 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116 Tran, supra note 37, at 885.
117 See id. at 886 for this discussion.
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The watershed case for challenging the override on Sixth Amendment
grounds came in a seven-to-two decision by the Court in Ring v. Arizona,' 1s
where it ruled that a judge may not add to a sentence beyond what accords
with a jury's verdict in death penalty cases. Ring extended the Court's
earlier decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,"9 where it held that "any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be . . . submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.", 0
The Court agreed to hear Ring to determine whether a trial judge,
sitting alone, could determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating
factors for death without violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.' 21 The defendant, Timothy Ring, who was convicted in 1994
of felony murder for the death of a Wells Fargo armored truck driver in
Glendale, Arizona, was sentenced to death by a trial judge under Arizona
law.' 22 In order to sentence Ring. to death, the trial judge had to find at least
one aggravating factor that distinguished Ring's crime from lesser ones. 
1 3
The trial judge found two aggravating circumstances: the crime was
committed for pecuniary gain and was particularly cruel and heinous. 2 4 He
found only one mitigating factor, which was that Ring had a minimal
criminal record.
25
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held
that any statute that required, following a jury's verdict of first-degree
murder, that the trial judge alone determine the existence of the aggravating
factors for the death penalty, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions. 26 The ruling was a logical
extension of Apprendi in that the finding of aggravating circumstances
increased the maximum sentence from life-to-death. 27  Noting the
extension of Apprendi to Ring, Justice Ginsburg wrote, "The right to trial
by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly
diminished if it encompassed the fact-finding necessary to increase a
"' 536 U.S. 584, 608-09 (2002).
"9 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
120 Id. at 476.
121 536 U.S. at 588.
122 Id. at 5 89-90.
123 Id. at 593.
124 Id. at 594-95.
2' Id. at 595.
116 Ring, 536 U.S. at 584.
127 Id. at 609.
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defendant's sentence by two years [as was the case in Apprendi], but not the
fact-finding necessary to put him to death."'
' 28
In Ring, the Court struck down Arizona's judge-only capital
sentencing law, 129 along with the judge-only sentencing schemes in four
other states. 30 The question now is whether the Ring holding invalidates
the override scheme in Alabama and Florida, where the judge is also the
final arbiter with respect to the factual findings required to sentence death.
If the Court accepts that the override system is essentially a judge-only
sentencing scheme, as Justice Stevens did in Harris,13' then the override
laws should be struck down as well. The likely response is that in cases
where the judge overrides the jury's sentence, she alone has made the
factual determinations required for death, which on its face violates the
Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Ring. However, state appellate courts
have upheld the override, although on very tenuous grounds.
C. THE STATES INTERPRET RING
The case of Bottoson v. Moore132 reflects the tenuous ground on which
the override law in Florida has been upheld after Ring. The justices of the
Florida Supreme Court in essence concluded that although all signs point to
the Florida override being unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds, it
was unwilling to take that step without explicit instructions from the
Court.
133
Linroy Bottoson was convicted of first-degree felony murder in
Florida in 1979 and was sentenced to death by the trial judge, who
determined the aggravating outweighed the mitigating circumstances.1
34
The U.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari as a post-conviction
appeal, but stayed his execution in February 2002, placing it in abeyance
until it issued its opinion in Ring and could determine whether he should be
afforded relief under that decision. 135  After handing down Ring in June
2002, the Court lifted the stay and sent the case back to the Florida Supreme
128 Id.
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-452 to 454 (West Supp. 1973).
13' Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (the states included Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, and Colorado).
13' Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516-19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). The Florida Supreme Court issued an
identical opinion in the case of King v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002), where the
petitioner, a defendant sentenced to death like Bottoson, sought the same relief. The Florida
Supreme Court issued its rulings in these cases on the same day, making the same arguments
regarding Ring's effect on the Florida override law.
133 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695.
134 Id. at 693.
135 Id.
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Court without explicit instructions to reconsider the case in light of Ring.
36
The Florida Supreme Court took this as a sign that Ring did not invalidate
the Florida override law.
In Bottoson, the justices of the Florida Supreme Court were divided
over the implications of Ring, yet agreed in result that they would not
presently invalidate the override. 3 7 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
lack of instruction for the case to be reconsidered in light of Ring, the
Florida Supreme Court focused heavily on past U.S. Supreme Court
precedents that have upheld the Florida override over the past quarter
century.138 The Florida court refused to invalidate the override, citing the
rule that in cases where there appears to be a conflict between precedent
that directly addressed the issue (i.e., the Profitt line of cases) and a separate
line of cases where the reasoning might suggest overruling the precedent
(i.e., Ring), the courts "should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to [the U.S. Supreme Court] the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.'
39
The Florida Supreme Court, in its plurality opinion, noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court did not instruct it to reconsider Bottoson in light of Ring.
40
The Florida court also noted that Bottoson had a prior conviction in his
record, which under Apprendi is the one allowed exception to the black
letter rule.' 4' A jury must determine all aggravating factors that lead to a
sentence beyond that contemplated in the jury's verdict, except prior
convictions. 42  Accordingly, the court held that the Apprendi and Ring
holdings did not apply to Bottoson's specific case. 41 Others, like Justice
Wells, focused on policy noting that any extension of Ring to the Florida




138 The Florida Supreme Court listed these U.S. Supreme Court precedents as upholding
the override law: Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976).
139 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
140 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695 ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other courts]
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.").
14' Id. at 718-19.
142 Id. at 713 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)) ("Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the





because "all of the individuals on Florida's death row will have a new basis
for challenging the validity of their sentences.",144 But several of the Florida
justices signaled their concern that Ring is, in fact, applicable to the Florida
law.145  In due course, the Florida Supreme Court will likely encounter
another case in which the defendant's life sentence has been overridden, but
where the issue of a prior conviction is absent.
Chief Justice Anstead's opinion takes direct aim at the Sixth
Amendment flaws in the Florida override law. Anstead writes that "Ring is
clearly the most significant death penalty decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court since the decision in Furman" and that the Florida court "cannot
simply stand mute in the face of such a momentous decision."'
' 46
Conceding that the Florida Supreme Court had been wrong in its
earlier prediction that the Court would not extend Apprendi to the death
penalty, the Chief Justice cited numerous concerns for the Florida system in
the wake of Ring. 47  His main concern was that because judges
independently make the factual determinations on aggravating factors and
then use those findings during sentencing, the scheme violates Ring's
requirement that a jury make those factual findings. 148 Moreover, Florida
juries never make any findings of fact regarding the existence of
144 Id. Justice Wells went on to note:
These challenges could possibly result in entitlements to entire repeats of penalty phase trials, in
turn leading to repeats of post conviction proceedings, and then new federal habeas proceedings.
Evidence will clearly have grown stale or have been lost or destroyed, witnesses will be
unavailable, and memories will surely have faded. Importantly, all of those involved in these
human tragedies will have to relive horrid experiences in order to reestablish the factual bases of
these cases, many which are undeniably heinous.
Id.
145 See, e.g., Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Quince, J., specially concurring) ("We appear
to be left with a judicial fact-finding process that is directly contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Ring."); id. at 718 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) ("When the
dictates of Ring are applied to Florida's capital sentencing statute, I believe our statute is
rendered flawed because it lacks a unanimity requirement for the 'death qualifying'
aggravator.").
146 Id. at 703 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only).
147 Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only):
The United States Supreme Court has now held in Ring that its prior decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, requiring findings of fact by a jury of sentencing factors that may affect the ultimate
penalty and sentence imposed, does apply to death penalty cases. That holding means that juries,
not judges, must make the findings of fact that determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances that in turn may be used as the justification and predicate for a death sentence.
This holding, of course, conflicts with our previous denial of relief to Bottoson based on our
erroneous conclusion that the Supreme Court would not apply Apprendi to death penalty cases.
The decision in Ring makes our error apparent.
148 Id. at 704-05 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only).
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aggravating circumstances and therefore no jury fact-findings are ever
considered by the state supreme court when conducting its Tedder review
(when an override occurs). 149  Clearly, Anstead suggests that when
presented with a suitable case, he would lean toward declaring the override
unconstitutional for these reasons.15 0  Another justice signaled his
willingness to reach the same conclusion. 51  As Part V discusses, the
Florida justices have even gone so far as to suggest possible legislative
remedies to correct the flaws in the system.
The Alabama courts have not been as straightforward about the likely
effect of Ring on that state's override law. In May 2002, an Alabama
appeals court decided a petition invoking Ring in the case of Tomlin v.
State,12 where the defendant, Phillip Wayne Tomlin, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death for killing two people.5 3 After Ring
was decided, the appeals court allowed the parties an opportunity to file
briefs addressing the effect of Ring on Tomlin's death sentence.' 54 Tomlin
argued that Alabama's override was unconstitutional because the
aggravating circumstances in his case were decided by the trial judge, not
the jury. 55 But the court held that because Tomlin was sentenced to death
based on the aggravating circumstance of having killed two people, 5 6 the
jury's verdict encompassed this factor. Thus, there was no Ring
violation. 
57
In May 2003, an Alabama appeals court addressed the same issue in
Martin v. State.5 8 Martin had been convicted of murdering his wife for
$377,000 in life insurance proceeds, which made the murder a capital
offense under section 13A-5-40(a)(7) because it was committed for
pecuniary gain. 59  The jury recommended life imprisonment without
149 Id. at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only).
SO Id. at 704-05 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only).
'' See id. at 724 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
152 Tomlin v. State, No. CR-98-2126, 2002 WL 1136439 (Ala. Crim. App. May 31,
2002), overruled by Ex Parte Tomlin, 2003 WL 22272851 (Ala. Oct. 3, 2003).
' Id. at *2.
114 Id. at *56 (McMillan, J.) ("After Ring was released, we allowed the State and Tomlin
an opportunity to file supplemental briefs.").
' Id. at *50-51.
156 The aggravating circumstances were found pursuant to ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(l 0)
(1994).
"' Tomlin, at *50-5 1.
158 Martin v. State, No. CR-99-2249, 2003 WL 21246587 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30,
2003).
159 Id. at *1.
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parole, but the trial judge overrode the jury's verdict.160 Martin argued that
because the trial judge made the findings of the existence of aggravating
circumstances in his case, Ring rendered his sentence unconstitutional.16
The court rejected Martin's argument because he was eligible for death
only because he had committed murder for pecuniary gain. Pecuniary gain
is an aggravating circumstance under section 13A-5-49(6) and thus was
found to have been proved to the jury as required by Ring.
162
The court made a point of noting that the Ring Court did not address
whether the judicial override was constitutional and that without direction,
it would continue to rely on Harris v. Alabama,163 a case which upheld the
Alabama override in 1995. It seems only a matter of time though before the
Alabama courts are presented with a case where a judge alone has found the
existence of aggravating circumstances in violation of Ring. As the
Alabama scheme has the fewest safeguards of the two override states,' 64 it
appears particularly susceptible to Sixth Amendment challenges.
V. RETURNING THE OVERRIDE TO ITS ORIGINIAL PURPOSE
Sixth Amendment challenges have gained traction in the courts as Part
IV suggests. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that defendants, as a
general proposition, are entitled to a jury determination on any fact that
increases the maximum penalty contemplated by the jury's verdict and this
rule has been extended to the death penalty context in Ring. 65 The Florida
Supreme Court has signaled its willingness to correct the Sixth Amendment
flaws in the override scheme. 66 The Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth
Amendment challenges are also persuasive, although they have not been
accepted by the courts thus far.'
61
The state court opinions and scholarly literature on the override
suggest various ways of revising this troubled system. One way to avoid
the constitutional problems would be to repeal the override in favor of a
jury-only system. 68 The states are hesitant to overhaul their entire systems
160 id.
161 Id. at *17.
162 Id.
163 513 U.S. 504, 506 (1995).
164 The Tedder standard is not required in Alabama as it is in Florida. See supra Part
II.B.
165 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
166 See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
167 See supra Part Ill.
168 Tran, supra note 37, at 887 ("Due to the grave constitutional concerns posed by jury
override statutes, it appears that the only feasible solution is to repeal such [override]
schemes. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana should follow the lead of their sister
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for the obvious reason of not wanting to encourage more appeals and incur
high administrative costs implementing a new system. In addition, many
believe the life-to-death override adds an additional check on the jury's
discretion. 169  However, for policy reasons,17° and for the constitutional
reasons outlined in Part IV, the override needs to be reformed.
One scholar has suggested that the states restructure the way they
bifurcate the trial and sentencing phases by including the finding of
aggravating circumstances in the trial phase.'71 For example, under Ohio's
statutory framework, aggravating factors are pled in the indictment,
considered by the jury at the trial phase, and are proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, which passes the Apprendi and Ring requirements.1
72
The benefit of the Ohio system is that it "identifie[s] all the relevant
aggravating circumstances to be placed before the sentencer" and "narrows
the issues for the penalty phase.' 73 Such a system avoids the duplication
that exists in the override, where the judge and jury listen to separate
hearings on sentencing factors, and provides the additional assurance that a
unanimous jury has determined all aggravating factors. 74  Moreover,
Justice Scalia has already endorsed this revised bifurcated system, which
makes it more likely to meet with the Court's approval. 75
Justices of the Florida Supreme Court suggest that, in the wake of
Ring, at least one aggravating factor should be determined by the jury. This
seems to be the minimum the states are required to do to satisfy Ring.
Justice Shaw provided this recommendation in Bottoson v. Moore for
correcting the "flaw" in the Florida override.' 7 6 He suggests adding the
states and adopt sentencing procedures that better protect the rights of criminal defendants.")
(emphasis added). Note that the states would be taking Indiana's lead, as that state changed
to ajury-only system on July 1, 2002. Liptak, supra note 5, atA21.
169 Although the data presented by Liptak, supra note 5, would suggest the override has
not worked as a check on "inflamed" juries in Alabama and Florida, where judges are
elected.
170 See Liptak, supra note 5, at A21.
171 Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal
Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 104
(2001).
72 Id. at 105.
173 Id.
' Id. at 105-07.
175 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612-13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Those States
that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so-by
requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factors in the sentencing phase or, more simply,
by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the
guilt phase.").
176 833 So. 2d 693, 710 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in the result only).
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following language to the Florida jury instructions for capital sentencing:
"In order to recommend a sentence of death, you must unanimously find
that at least one aggravating circumstance is present beyond a reasonable
doubt; this finding must be based on the facts as you find them from the
evidence, 1 7  Justice Shaw interpreted Ring to require that aggravating
circumstances, of which at least one must be present to sentence death,
must be subject to the same treatment as other elements of the offense. 178
The aggravating factor takes on the equivalent status of the other elements
that must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Pariente made the same recommendation that jurors become
the fact-finders as to the required aggravating circumstances. He also
suggested that trial courts "utilize special verdicts that require the jury to
indicate what aggravators the jury has found and the jury vote as to each
aggravator."'' 79 As both Justices Shaw and Pariente note, the override
scheme, at a minimum, can be corrected by making the jury the finder of
any fact used to elevate the maximum sentence from life-to-death.
The best approach to reforming the override, however, would be to
eliminate the life-to-death part of the scheme and retain the death-to-life
option. The only change to the law would be that in the instance where the
jury renders an advisory verdict of life, the decision would stand as the final
sentence. Not only would this be easy to implement as it retains many of
the same procedural features of the current system, but it would solve
numerous constitutional flaws.
There are three main benefits to eliminating the life-to-death option.
First, it would assuage Fourteenth Amendment concerns that judges use the
override for political purposes. As studies suggest, 80 judges face political
pressure by the electorate to sentence death;' 8 ' by eliminating this option,
the judge is not tempted to override a jury's life recommendation in order to
keep her job. The judge would also retain the option to override a death
verdict in the case of an "inflamed" jury, which was the original
justification for the system. 8 2  At a time when we know innocent
177 Id. at 718 (Shaw, J., concurring in the result only).
178 Id. (Shaw, J., concurring in the result only).
179 Id. at 719, 723 (Shaw, J., concurring in the result only).
1s0 See Burnside, supra note 3, at 1042-44.
181 The facts from Delaware, where appointed judge have only overridden death
sentences in favor of life, bears this out. Id. at 1043.
182 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (noting that the override system
"provid[es] capital defendants with more, rather than less, judicial protection").
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defendants have been sentenced to death, 183 this feature of the override is
particularly attractive.
Second, this suggested reform would mitigate against Eighth
Amendment concerns as the judge would not be able to substitute her
opinion for the jury's. As the best reflection of the community's judgment,
the jury would play its proper role in determining whether the defendant's
conduct warrants death. By limiting the judge's override of the jury's life
verdict, the "link between contemporary community values and the penal
system" is strengthened.
8 4
Finally, this reform would correct the system's flaws with respect to
the Sixth Amendment. By giving the trial judge override authority only in
the death-to-life context, the judge would be reducing the jury's sentence in
compliance with Apprendi and Ring, not increasing it.'" 5 The jury would be
making its own unanimous independent fact-findings with respect to
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and these findings would only be
overturned to decrease the maximum penalty.
There are real policy and constitutional concerns that need to be
addressed with respect to the override scheme as it is currently administered
in Florida and Alabama. As these recommendations suggest, the override
states need to return to the system's original purpose by making these
suggested changes to ensure capital defendants' constitutional rights are
guaranteed.
183 See American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, supra note 81.
184 Scheffel, supra note 32, at 47 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984)
(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
185 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
497 (2000).
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